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Introduction
How does the introduction of securitization affect banks' operations and financing choices?
Asset securitization expands the financing possibilities of banks by allowing the transformation of illiquid assets on bank balance sheets, e.g., mortgage loans, into marketable securities.
Banks can use this financial innovation to fund asset growth and also to alter their capital structures, with securitizations substituting for more traditional liabilities such as bank deposits. Indeed, securitization is a financial innovation that fundamentally affects the financial intermediation process performed by banks and is reflected on the asset and liability sides of banks' balance sheets.
The financial literature has studied some determinants of the expansion of securitization, such as the corporate-taxation advantages in Pennacchi et al. (2014) , and has also examined its effects on banks' operations, credit standards and credit expansion, e.g., Loutskina and Strahan (2009) and Loutskina (2011) .
1
Using data from the Spanish banking system during the period 1988-2006 we empirically examine a series of hypothesis on the effects that securitization may have produced on banks' capital structures. We motivate these hypotheses with insights from traditional theories of capital structures in corporate finance; namely the trade-off and the pecking order theories, (Myers 1984, and Myers and Majluf 1984) . In particular, as suggested by the trade-off theory we assume that there is an optimal capital structure for each bank, which is potentially affected when access to a new financing possibility (securitization of assets in our case) becomes available. Based on this simple insight, we test hypotheses that consider whether securitization will be used more intensively by (i) those banks with more profitable uses for new funds and (ii) those banks for which access to other financing sources was restricted or particularly costly. Furthermore, motivated by the logic of the pecking order theory we examine the position securitization takes in the pecking order of bank financing choices and relate that to the adverse selection effects that banks may experience when issue securities.
However, the literature has not studied in detail how securitization changes the financing choices and capital structure of banks, which is the focus of this paper.
The Spanish banking system provides an ideal framework for studying securitization as a shock on the availability of bank financing alternatives for several reasons. While in other countries, such as the United States, securitization developed progressively beginning in the early eighties; in Spain the process can be better described as a regime shift. Only after several legal changes that occurred in 1998 could banks effectively consider securitizing their assets. 2 The sample period ends in 2006, just before the financial crisis has removed loan securitization as a funding possibility for banks. . There is also evidence that securitization does not necessarily worsen adverse selection problems, as shown by Benmelech et al. (2012) for the securitization of corporate loans.
In addition, securitization was promptly embraced by Spanish banks which, on average, proceeded to securitize a substantial part of their assets (e.g., more than 25% of their mortgages). 4 Our study is organized into three main parts. In the first part, we provide a descriptive analysis of (i) the differences between the capital structure of Spanish banks before 1999 and at the end of 2006, (ii) the relation of securitization with the decoupling of lending and deposit activities of banks, and (iii) the changes in banks' funding policies and the role of securitization as a source of funds.
Finally, the Spanish banking system includes entities of different characteristics in terms of their access to finance, which provides a useful source of exogenous variation for our tests. In particular, this heterogeneity provides a useful framework to study the extent to which securitization might overcome adverse selection in capital markets.
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The second part of this study examines the determinants of securitization. Motivated by our premise that securitization affects the optimal mix of financing sources, we examine whether securitization is used more intensively by those banks with higher growth opportunities, higher financial costs of alternative sources of funds and lower costs of securitization. We consider several aspects of the securitization process including whether or not banks used securitization, but also the loan amounts securitized and time until the first use of securitization.
We examine in particular the different roles of deposits in the Spanish credit expansions of 1988-1991 (pre-securitization period) and 1998-2006 (post-securitization period).
In the third part we examine how securitization fits in the pecking order of financing choices by banks. As bank balance sheets are opaque (Morgan, 2002) , adverse selection can impose greater discounts on the debt and equity issuances of banks than on financial securities issued by nonfinancial firms. Furthermore, the sale of individual bank loans and pools of assets (with no tranching) 6 can also be subject to large discounts, because banks have private information 7 on borrowers' conditions (DeMarzo, 2005; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999). In this context, banks might raise new funds at a lower cost through securitization because the process of pooling and tranching loans has the potential to reduce informational asymmetries (DeMarzo, 2005) . To examine the securitization decision we modify the pecking order equation 8 There are a number of findings that emerge from our analysis. First, loan securitization is associated with substantial changes in the liability structure of banks. In particular, the use of securitization is associated with lower reliance on deposits to finance the in Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2003) and explore whether banks are likely to first choose securitization over other sources of funds and if this effect is more pronounced when they face more severe adverse selection problems (Bharath et al., 2009 ).
4. During the study period Spanish banks became the second largest issuers in Europe of ABS (after British banks) and of covered bonds (after German banks). 5. From 2005 onwards, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) forced Spanish banks to keep in their balance sheets securitized loans unless a substantial part of the risk and profits of these securitizations had been transferred. In practice, banks held more than 90% of their securitized loans on their balance sheets. We keep track of all the securitized loans. In order to homogenize the data and facilitate comparisons, we add back into bank balance sheets any securitized loan pool that was off-balance-sheet during the sample period. 6. See the seminal article by Pennacchi (1988) on the process of selling loans and its associated risks. Drucker and Puri (2009) document substantial growth in the U.S. secondary loan market in spite of informational problems (a growth rate of 25% from 1991 to 2006 has led to a market size of $236.6 billion in 2006). 7. Adverse selection can be reduced by the presence of implicit agreements, as in Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) , and restrictive covenants, as in Drucker and Puri (2009) . In collateralized loan obligations (CLO), adverse selection can be reduced because securitized loans are fractions of syndicated loans, and reputation as well as the stake of lead's bank, reduce information asymmetries (Benmelech et al., 2012) . 8. Frank and Goyal (2008) provide a survey of the literature of the pecking order theory.
expansion of bank credit. These changes in the liability structure are more apparent for banks that face severe adverse selection problems and have restricted access to financial markets.
Second, securitization is used more frequently by banks with stronger growth opportunities, higher relative cost of financing alternatives and tighter liquidity constraints. Bank size is positively associated with securitization, but large banks also make above-average use of equity and debt financing. In relative terms, securitization represents a higher proportion of external funds for smaller and medium-size banks. Securitization also tends to be higher in the pecking order of financing choices of small-and medium-size banks and non-listed banks, which are likely to face more severe adverse selection problems.
The existing literature on bank capital structure generally considers theoretical frameworks focused on the combination of lending and deposit activities.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the characteristics of the data used. Section 3 describes the effects of the introduction of securitization on banks' capital structures. Section 4 analyzes banks' securitization decisions with regression models.
Section 5 examines the position of securitization in the hierarchy of financing sources of banks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
In this traditional banking setting, earlier articles have studied the impact of market conditions and asymmetric information on the optimal financial structure of banks, e. g., Gatev et The main difference between these two forms of securitization is the type of issuer: small and regional banks formed groups and used multiple-bank securitization, whereas larger banks with access to capital markets issued covered bonds directly. From an economic perspective, however, both mechanisms transform illiquid assets stocked in the balance sheet of banks into tradable securities. Table 1 shows the number of banks that securitize for every year and form of bank.
Out of the 212 banks that exist at the start of the sample, 103 securitize loans at least once during the sample period. 14. This is similar to a secured bond issued by a non-financial corporation, which is guaranteed by both specific collateral and also the credit of the corporation itself. 
Securitization and the evolution of balance sheets
We group bank balance sheet accounts in different subcategories. On the asset side, we consider three groups of items: (1) LOANS, which measures credit of all maturities granted by a bank to the non-financial sector (i.e., households and firms); (2) GOVBONDS, which accounts for the amount of government debt held by a bank; and (3) INTERBANK, which reflects a bank's net financial position in the interbank market (i.e., the difference between lent and borrowed funds, including the net position with the central bank). On the liability side, we consider four groups: (1) OWNFUNDS, which measures a bank's equity position (i.e., capital, reserves and insolvency funds); (2) DEBT, which corresponds to the amount of debt financing issued by a bank in wholesale markets (excluding the interbank market); (3) DEPOSITS, which includes traditional demand deposits held by banks and (4) SEC, which consists of the sum of securitized instruments issued by a bank. In addition to these items, we calculate a residual account, i.e., REST, which is computed as the difference of the assets and liabilities not considered in the other groups described in this paragraph.
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A number of stylized facts emerge from the aggregate data of the different groups of bank accounts, which is displayed in Table 2 ) and, to some extent, on wholesale debt financing (i.e., the weight of DEBT with respect to bank liabilities rises to 12.3% in 2006). This reliance on market debt financing was a major shift in the capital structure of Spanish banks and it is analyzed in further detail in section 4.
16. More specifically, REST includes the following asset side items: other holdings of financial assets (e. g, private fixedincome debt, cash, and derivatives), positions in the bank trading book, corrections for writing-off assets and other asset items. On the liability side, REST includes derivatives, other commercial obligations with suppliers, short positions in securities from overdrafts in repo operations and financial guarantees. For a more detailed explanation of all the groups and their components, see the Appendix.
Finally, the contribution of OWNFUNDS to bank liabilities is reduced to 8.7% in 2006, revealing a process of leveraging in the post-securitization period that has been also documented in previous studies.
Additional insight is gained from the comparison of the behavior of the banks that issue securitized loans to fund their operations and the banks that do not securitize. Figure 2 shows that the expansion of credit during the post-securitization period is particularly intense for banks that choose to securitize ( to 4.1%, significant at 1%) than for those banks that do not resort to securitization (a decrease from 13.5% to 5.2%, significant at 5%).
On the liability side, there are also significant differences between securitizing and non-securitizing banks. Most notably, the reduction of the weight of DEPOSITS with respect to total liabilities is particularly intense for securitizing banks, with a decrease from 84.1% in 1997 to 58.6% in 2006 (banks that do not securitize observe a change from 76.9% in 1997
to 73.5% in 2006). This difference occurs because securitizing banks present an average deposit growth rate of 10.6%, which is inferior to the growth rate of 13.6% for the deposits of non-securitizing banks. In addition, securitizing banks use the funds obtained from securitization to substitute for deposits as a source of funds. was limited by the evolution of deposits. In contrast, loans were able to grow in the latter period at a higher pace than deposits because banks had securitization as an additional financing source. It is precisely during an economic expansion when the demand for credit can increase at a higher pace than the volume of deposits. 17. Non-securitizing banks relied on debt issuances, which reached up to 15.6% of their assets, to fund their loan expansion. Securitizing banks also issued debt (12.2%), but used securitization more intensely (20.5%). 18. Cornett et al. (2011) argue that the volume of core deposits might decrease during expansion periods because savers look for higher returns, and it might increase during recessions because deposits are perceived as safe assets.
Since Table 2 shows that the volume of total deposits in Spain increases over time, our finding suggests that the recourse to securitization is not just compensating a fall in the volume of deposits, but it can be also due to an expansion of the demand for loans higher than deposit growth.
derived from stronger economic growth. In fact, the average GDP growth rate in the postsecuritization period was lower (3.5%) than in the pre-securitization period (4.1%).
We examine more formally the link between deposit and credit growth across individual banks with a set of regressions of credit growth on deposit and GDP growth.
Results are reported in Table 3 . We consider both OLS and fixed effect specifications and both indicate that the coefficient of deposit growth falls by 40% for the total sample of banks (4)). This result shows that the relationship between deposit and credit growth is less intense after banks can securitize, and it is also consistent with the hypothesis that securitization contributes to decouple the credit and deposit activities of banks (Loutskina, 2011; Loutskina and Strahan, 2009 ).
In Columns (5) to (8) of Table 3 , we examine the relation between credit and deposit growth for the subgroups of securitizing and non-securitizing banks. In this analysis, the evidence is less conclusive. Securitizing banks exhibit a relatively low coefficient on deposit growth in the OLS specifications (i.e., 0.30 in (5) relative to 0.47 for non-securitizing banks in (7)). However, we fail to find a stronger relationship between credit and deposit growth for non-securitizing banks once we include fixed effects (i.e., the deposit growth coefficient is 0.27 for securitizing banks in (6) and 0.23 for non-securitizing banks in (8)). A possible reason for these mixed results is that some common factors explain both securitization decisions and the growth rates of loans and deposits, making more difficult the interpretation of coefficients in these simple regressions. To consider this issue and other possibilities, we examine more carefully next the factors that affect banks' securitization decisions.
The determinants of the securitization decision
We consider insights that emanate from existing theories of capital structure to the case of banking firms in order to derive some testable predictions about their decision to securitize. In particular, we hypothesize that securitization alters the optimal mix of banks' financing choices because it (i) provides a novel source of finance whose attractiveness depends on banks financial choices (trade-off theory) and (ii) facilitates the access to market financing of banks facing severe adverse selection problems (pecking order theory).
The trade-off theory insights are based on the premise that banks that alter their capital structure and decide to securitize are those banks that are financially constrained i.e., that find it relatively more costly to finance investment opportunities with pre-existing sources of funds. In order to identify financially constrained banks, we consider three different dimensions: (i) the relative cost of securitization with respect to other funding alternatives, (ii) the growth opportunities in the banks' loan portfolios, and (iii) the liquidity position of banks.
Our hypothesis is that banks whose sources of funds are relatively more expensive, banks with more growth opportunities and banks with tighter liquidity conditions are more likely to benefit from the new financing possibility offered by securitization.
The pecking order theory suggests a more specific insight: securitization grants banks access to public market financing without facing an adverse selection high discount.
More specifically, securitization mitigates adverse selection since it reduces the informational problems associated with the direct sale of loans or pools of loans (DeMarzo, 2005) . To examine the empirical relevance of this insight, we analyze whether banks that are more affected by adverse selection costs are those that resort relatively more to raising market funds through securitization.
The rest of this section presents the variables that are used to proxy for the determinants of securitization among Spanish banks, an explanation of the empirical methodology employed for analysis and the results.
Variables
We distinguish five groups of explanatory variables: (1) proxies related to financing costs, (2) proxies related to liquidity, (3) proxies related to the growth opportunities of banks, (4) variables related to the market access possibilities of banks and (5) other control variables.
FINANCING COSTS
We have argued that the financial benefits of securitization are likely to be larger for banks that are constrained in their investment policy by their inability to resort to other sources of financing such as demand deposits, interbank loans and debt and equity issuances. These constraints could appear in the form of high financing costs associated with available funding alternatives. Banks can benefit from securitization provided that this financing source presents a lower relative financing cost than the existing alternatives.
Since we do not have price information to measure the costs of alternative financing sources, we use the relative amount of financial instruments held by the banks in the presecuritization period as proxies for the cost of the alternative financing sources. Implicitly this assumes that the observed capital structures of banks are the result of profit-maximizing strategies that take into account differences in the marginal financial costs of alternative financial sources. For instance, if a bank concentrates its financing in the pre-securitization period in only one source (i.e., deposits), one would expect that this source is particularly inexpensive for the bank (or alternatively that the financing cost of other funding alternatives is relatively higher). In this case, securitization would be less beneficial for banks with highlyconcentrated sources of finance, (since this probably reflects the access to a low cost financing source) and would be more beneficial to banks whose capital structure contains a wide set of sources.
In particular, for each bank-year, we consider the following variables for relative financing costs: We expect a negative relation between a bank's incentives to securitize and the ratio of this liquidity buffer with respect to the volume of loans that are to be financed.
The net interbank position is defined as Max{Interbank Loans -Interbank Deposits, 0}.
(ii) Past profitability / Loans: This variable is a proxy of the availability of internally generated funds that can be used to finance new loans. This variable is computed as the ratio of the profits of the previous year net of the distributed dividends with respect to the volume of loans to be financed. We expect that banks with higher retained earnings will have lower incentives to securitize.
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES
Banks with potentially higher growth opportunities are more likely to need financing, and securitization may help to cover this need. In order to capture growth potential, the existing literature suggests the use of the price-to-book ratio (e.g. the Tobin's Q ratio) 20 however, since a very large part of the banks in our sample are non-publicly traded we consider the following alternative proxies:
We estimate a series of projected loan growth (which we identify with banks growth opportunities) that we define as:
, where Lt is the balance of loans at the end of year t, and At-1 is the total assets at the end of year t-1. We use the ratio of the absolute difference of loan balances on year t and t-1 with respect to total assets on year t-1 to avoid large growth rates caused by small initial loan balances and to be consistent with the rest of variables defined below. Specifically, we estimate an autoregressive model that explains loan growth on year t as a function of the loan growth on year t-1 and t-2 with a rolling window of 10 years, which avoids differences in standard errors due to the growing number of years for observations that are observed later in the time horizon. For each year after t, we obtain the best prediction (based on the observed loan growth for years t-1 and t-2) of loan growth. The variable loans, Lt, includes loans to the public sector and loans to non-financial firms and households (both residents and non-residents).
We validate this proxy (i.e., the extent to which it measures bank growth opportunities) by considering its statistical relationship with the Tobin's Q ratio for the subsample of banks whose equity is publicly traded. In particular we regress Tobin's Q using as explanatory variables Projected Loan Growth and the rest of the explanatory variables considered in our model of the decision to securitize. We find that Projected Loan Growth is statistically significant at 1% while the rest of variables are not significant (OLS with robust standard errors clustered at bank level) and the R 2 amounts to 23%. When Projected Loan
Growth is the only explanatory variable, the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient remains unchanged, and it can explain up to 12% of the total variation of the priceto-book ratio.
(ii) As an alternative proxy for growth opportunities we use GrowthOpp i.e., the number of new regional markets in which banks enter to operate and the sum of GDP for the regional markets of bank operations. This alternative proxy is considered in the robustness analysis to test the validity of the results of the main specifications. These variables aim to capture whether the decision of banks to securitize has been driven by other securitization determinants, such as the possibility to manage credit risk in their portfolios or to perform regulatory capital arbitrage. We consider three proxies:
The ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL) in bank portfolios reveals their credit standards and levels of accumulated risk. We expect banks with a higher NPL to have riskier loans and stronger incentives to transfer those risks to investors via securitization.
(ii) RegCap: A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the Basel regulatory capital
ratio is below the 25 th percentile of the distribution and zero otherwise.
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(iii) Mortg/Loans: Mortgages are the most common underlying asset used in securitizations. Therefore, the weight of mortgage loans in a bank balance sheet controls for the possibility that banks with a higher proportion of mortgages securitize more often.
The regulatory capital ratio is computed by dividing regulatory capital (the portion of capital eligible to fulfill the capital requirements of the Basel Committee) by bank assets weighted according to their risk (Risk Weighted Assets or RWA). Banks closer to the regulatory limit, which is set at 8% in the Basel requirements, can find useful to use ABS/MBS as an instrument to ensure regulatory compliance.
Empirical strategy and results
We perform three sets of tests. First, we estimate two alternative specifications of a Probit model to investigate the determinants of the banks' decision to securitize (i.e., the "extensive margin"). We examine both the year-to-year decisions to securitize (with a panel dataset of bank conditions) and the decision to securitize at least once during the post-securitization period (with a cross sectional dataset of the initial conditions of banks at the start of this period). We consider this second estimation approach to account for the possibility that the decision to securitize is part of a long-term financial strategy and then require several years for its full implementation. amount of assets securitized by banks (i.e., the "intensive margin"), also considering the two estimation approaches used for the Probit model. Finally, we estimate duration models for the decision to securitize and explore which variables determine the speed at which a bank decides to securitize for the first time. Dep/Loans is negative and statistically significant in (1) which suggests that banks with lower relative marginal cost for deposits at the beginning of the securitization year are less likely to securitize during that period. In (2) Concentration has the expected negative sign but fails to be statistically significant.
RESULTS ON THE DECISION TO SECURITIZE
Banks with a higher stock of liquid assets with respect to loans (Liquidity/Loans) in 1999 are less likely to securitize. However, we do not find evidence that internally generated funds from past profits (Past Profit/Loans) reduce the incentives to securitize.
The coefficient on Projected Loan Growth is positive and highly significant which indicates that banks used securitization to fund credit growth, in line with preliminary evidence in Figure 3 . Securitization is associated with a substantial increase in the growth rate of banks' balance sheets, which increased from 8.9% per annum during the pre-securitization years to 14.0% during the post-securitization period.
There is also a positive and significant coefficient for lnAssets, suggesting that large banks with an existing record of operations in financial markets can gain access to securitization. In addition, we find evidence that, other things equal, savings banks and credit cooperatives are more likely to securitize than commercial banks. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that securitization can reduce adverse selection problems if groups of banks can jointly issue bonds backed by a common loan portfolio.
As for other control variables, there is no evidence that Spanish banks used securitization as a risk management tool (i.e., to mitigate and transfer credit risk) or as a mean to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage. This result could be explained by the tougher regulation on conduits and SIV (Structured Investment Vehicles) in Spain, which was precisely designed to limit off-balance sheet risks and regulatory capital arbitrage. 24. Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2013) study conduits as a case of "regulatory arbitrage", and they notice that banks based in Spain and Portugal did not set up conduits.
Columns (5) and (6) show the estimates obtained with the panel data of year to year securitization decisions. In these models, the bank decision to securitize in year t is explained by the value of explanatory variables in year t-1. The qualitative results are similar to the previous estimations in columns (1) to (4), though the magnitude of the coefficients is generally smaller. The variable Interbank/Loans becomes statistically significant, but
Dep/Loans loses its significance and none of the other financial cost proxies is significant in (5). As stated above, these weaker findings could be the result of the time frame for the decision to securitize. Securitization choices would not be made on a yearly basis, but they would rather form part of medium to long-term financial strategy.
We perform a number of tests to evaluate the robustness of the above results. First, we consider additional growth proxies as explanatory variables. Therefore, as alternative controls of bank growth possibilities, we include: (i) the (weighted) GDP growth of all the regions where a bank operates and (ii) a dummy variable that identifies banks opening branches in new regional markets. We expect that banks will have higher growth opportunities if they operate in regions with high economic growth or they have entered new markets. The coefficient for weighted GDP growth is significant at the 5% level if this variable is the only control for growth opportunities in the model for the decision to securitize. If both weighted GDP growth and the dummy identifying new entrants are included, the coefficient on the former variable is only significant at the 10% level. The dummy identifying new entrants is not significant even when included as the single proxy for growth possibilities. When we include these two proxies together with Projected Loan Growth, the latter variable is significant at the 5% level whereas the weighted GDP growth and the dummy for new entrants are found to be not significant. Thus, we interpret that the three variables are capturing a common effect, and that Projected Loan Growth captures all the relevant information contained in the other two variables.
For the panel data models, we also consider two additional dummy variables as proxies for access to financial markets: (i) a dummy for banks listed in the stock market and
(ii) a dummy for banks that have issued at some point in time debt instruments in wholesale markets. The results show positive and significant coefficients for these variables, in line with the predictions of theoretical models. Nevertheless, these variables are not included in the main analysis because they are highly correlated with the identity of some banks, creating an overfitting problem (i. e., perfect predictions for some banks) in the regressions for the decision to securitize. Table 5 displays results for the models of the asset amounts securitized by Spanish banks (i.e., the "intensive margin"), which are estimated with a Tobit specification with standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at bank level. The dependent variable is the amount of funds securitized by a bank normalized by the size of its assets, but the results presented in Table 5 still follow the same structure as the estimates of the Probit models in Table 4 . The explanatory variables are the same as in the Probit analysis of subsection 4.2.1. Comparing the coefficients of the explanatory variables on Table 4 and Table 5 , we observe that the proxies for liquidity, growth opportunities and market access maintain their sign and statistical significance. These determinants of the securitization decision have a comparable qualitative impact on the intensive and extensive margins.
RESULTS ON THE AMOUNT SECURITIZED
The conclusions about the effect of financial costs are also comparable in Table 4 and Table 5 , but not all the coefficients for this sub-set of variables are equal across specifications. In Table 5 , evidence of the effect of financial costs on securitization is supported by the negative and statistically significant coefficients of Interbank/Loans and Equity/Loans in columns (1) and (3) (instead of Dep/Loans as in Table 4 ) and Dep/Loans and Interbank/Loans in column (5) (instead of only Interbank/Loans as in Table 4 ). Finally, other control variables do not have a significant effect on the amount securitized, as it was the case for the decision to securitize. Table 6 presents estimates of the duration models, which assume that the time elapsed until a bank securitizes for the first time is governed by a parameterized hazard rate. The function ) , ( X t h for the hazard rate is defined as the product of a common time factor and a function of bank level variables that captures observed heterogeneity across banks, i.e.,
RESULTS FROM DURATION ANALYSIS
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 report results for an exponential model with a constant conditional probability of securitization over time, 
25
When we allow for time dependency of the hazard rate, we observe that the probability to securitize increases over time: the estimates of p are 1.9 and 1.91 in the Weibull specifications in columns (3) and (4). This result is consistent with the increasing number of securitizations over time reported in Table 1 . The sign and magnitude of the coefficients of bank level variables are not significantly affected by the assumption of time dependence of the hazard rate. We thus provide unified comments on these coefficients for the specifications with and without time dependence.
We observe that a higher deposit base (Dep/Loans) is associated with a longer time until first securitization, which is an outcome consistent with the results for the Probit and source is associated with a low relative financial cost of that source and therefore a lower probability of using new financing alternatives.
Other variables with significant coefficients include Projected Loan Growth, Savings, Coop and lnAssets. All of these variables receive coefficients higher than 1 and an increase in the value of one of them reduces the expected time until the first securitization. This result is consistent with the positive relation found between these variables and the decision to securitize, as reported in Table 4 and Table 5 .
In order to evaluate the predictive power of the duration models, we present in Figure 4 the distribution across banks of the predicted number of years until first securitization. The specification in Column (3) of Table 6 is used to produce the predictions. We present separately the distributions of securitizing and non-securitizing banks. The model predicts a lower number of years until first securitization for banks that actually securitized. The distribution for this type of banks is concentrated around values below 5 years: 63% and 93% of the cases for securitizing banks receive respectively predictions below 5 and 10 years. For non-securitizing banks, the distribution is more dispersed and the time until first securitization is predicted larger than 10 years for 78% of the cases, which is out of the temporal scope of the sample.
Empirical analysis based on different models and estimation techniques provides evidence consistent with some key theoretical predictions. More specifically, banks are found to be more likely to securitize when the costs of alternative sources of funds are higher, growth opportunities are higher and the proportion of liquid assets held in balance sheets is lower. There is also evidence that savings banks and credit cooperatives are more likely to make early use of securitization than commercial banks. We argue that the reason for this latter result is that securitization grants these banks with a form of access to financial markets that was not previously available to them. In the next section, we provide further analysis to of the link between the access to financial markets through securitization and the reduction of costs related to asymmetric information.
In this section, we further investigate the hypothesis of whether securitization particularly affects banks that bear high informational costs to access capital markets. Specifically, we examine how securitization fits in the pecking order of financing choices by banks. To examine the securitization decision we build on the analysis of Shyam-Sunder and Myers More specifically, the typical study is to estimate a regression of the form:
and tests the hypothesis β=1 (i. e., financial needs are covered only by issuing new debt).
Similarly we estimate a regression of the amount of (new) securitized loans on the bank's financial deficit (FD). For bank i on year t, we define its financial deficit as:`
where RESERVES consists of banks' reserves, including current profits, and the rest of variables have been defined in section 3. We then consider the following specification: . Intuitively, the coefficient on FD is expected to be higher for small and non-listed banks, which are thought to finance a higher proportion of their financial deficit through the issuance of securitized loans. Table 7 presents our estimates for the sample of banks with a positive financial deficit. We report robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at the bank level.
The first column of Table 7 shows the results of the base specification in [2] . We find that β<1, which implies the rejection of a strict (and more narrow) version of the pecking order hypothesis. Column (2) in Table 7 severe informational problems and restricted access to debt and equity markets. In summary, Table 7 provides suggestive evidence that this type of banks used securitization as a tool to reduce adverse selection costs and raise funds in wholesale financial markets. Table 7 . Estimation of specification (4) in Table 7 
Conclusions
Securitization enables banks to shift from a traditional business model financed through the expansion of deposits to new business models that rely on the demand for securitized assets in international financial markets. In this study we find that securitization is also associated with substantial changes in the capital structure and funding policies of banks, in particular a substantial reduction in their reliance on deposits as a financing source. In addition, securitizing banks are observed to increase their loan volumes and their ratios of loans over total assets, whereas they decrease their holdings of low-return liquid assets.
The transition to a more market-dependent financing model has enabled banks to decouple the evolution of their credit activity from the capacity to raise deposits. This financial development, however, has also increased the vulnerability of banks to shocks in the financial markets. Non-securitizing banks have maintained a high weight of deposits over total funds and they have been able to cope better with the higher financial constraints observed after the start of the crisis in 2007 (Cornett et al., 2011) . In this study, we fail to find evidence that relates securitization to banks credit risk management or regulatory capital arbitrage. While this may be due to our particular sample, we are able by contrast to provide evidence that relates the banks' securitization choice to other financing choices made by banks in order to fund their credit expansions.
Our cross-sectional findings are also interesting and consistent with the idea that the benefits of securitization can be associated to certain bank characteristics that correlate with their capital structure choices. Our empirical analysis indicates a positive relation between securitization benefits and the presence of funding constraints on credit growth, which can take the form of high cost of financial alternatives or outright exclusion from financial markets.
We find evidence that securitization can grant access to financial markets to banks that were previously excluded due to severe adverse selection problems. Securitization is higher in the pecking order of financing choices for these financially constrained banks than for banks less affected by information asymmetries. may be necessary to provide alternative and flexible financing sources to banks, particularly to those institutions which find it more difficult issuing capital throughout the traditional forms of finance i.e., debt and equity. Note. 
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Growth Proxies
Projected Loan Growth (1) (2) (3) Note. SEC is the volume of securitized assets issued by a bank at t, and FD is the financial deficit of the bank For deposits, Spanish accounting regulation establishes that the liability counterparty of an operation of securitization is accounted for in the deposit item of the balance sheet.
However, we consider a more refined definition of deposits (i.e., funds collected from consumers in the retail business of banks) and separate them from securitization. To accomplish this, we define DEPOSITS as the difference between the deposit item of the balance sheet and the outstanding amount of securitized assets SEC.
